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On 4 May 2006, the Witwatersrand LocalDivision of the High Court inJohannesburg woke up to an atmosphere
atypical of a court environment. On that day, police
officers were present in large numbers, and scores
of people were dancing, chanting and singing
outside the court building. All eyes were on Judge
van der Merwe who was about to read his
judgment in the case of the State v Jacob Zuma. 
A woman, whose name the judge decided not to
disclose, had laid a charge of rape against Zuma –
the deputy president of the ruling African National
Congress (ANC) and former deputy president of the
country. The charge was essentially that on 2
November 2005 Zuma raped the complainant in his
home in Johannesburg. The accused was found not
guilty. 
This case will be recorded in history as one that
attracted attention on a scale seldom witnessed in a
criminal case in the post-1994 dispensation. It
sparked unprecedented interest among lawyers,
politicians, governmental, non-governmental
organisations and the general public, both nationally
and internationally. Even the trial court accepted this
fact in passing judgment. The judge declared that:
“This trial created an unknown interest among the
public at large and received enormous media
coverage, printed as well as electronic.”1
Moreover, the judge conceded to a live broadcast of
the judgment, because despite the court’s dislike of
any form of publicity, it accepted that times have
changed and that the coverage could be useful and
educational.
One of the significant and controversial attributes of
this extensive judgment was the interpretation of
section 227 of the Criminal Procedure Act No. 51 of
1977. The accused’s legal representatives made an
application in terms of this section to get permission
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Rape is one of the most underreported crimes worldwide, not least because of the trauma facing complainants
once the case goes to trial. The case of S v Zuma was a clear illustration of this problem. The court’s decision
to allow Zuma’s lawyers to cross-examine the complainant about her sexual history (governed by section 227
of the Criminal Procedure Act) has far-reaching implications. The court’s failure to deal properly with section
227 has set a worrying precedent that is now binding on the lower courts where the majority of rape cases are
heard. Moreover, the judgment does not reflect a consideration of the impact on the complainant’s right to
human dignity, privacy and equality. This means the court missed an opportunity to align section 227 with the
constitutional dictates that now govern the administration of justice in South Africa. 
to adduce evidence of the complainant’s sexual
history. The court was therefore given an opportunity
to interpret the provisions of this section – an
opportunity which, it is argued here, the court did not
take. 
The way in which the court dealt with this
application is significant for two reasons:
• On the basis of the legal doctrine of precedence, 
lower courts are bound by decisions of the higher
court. Whatever interpretation the judge attached
to the provisions of this section would, therefore,
be binding on the lower courts throughout the
country. This is significant given that a vast majority
(not less than 90%) of rape cases are dealt with in
the lower courts, namely the regional courts.  
• The applicability of the Constitution when 
interpreting the law is also relevant. As the supreme
law against which all laws must be tested for their
validity, the question is whether the presiding
officer must wait until one of the parties challenges
a particular legal provision as unconstitutional
before s/he deals with it. This is particularly
important because under the parliamentary
sovereignty system that was in place before the
Constitution was enacted, all that had to be
considered before a ruling was made, was what
was stated in law. The current situation is, however,
very different. 
This article deals with the two points raised above
with specific focus on how the court dealt with the
application in terms of section 227.
Did the court deal correctly with Section 227 and its
proviso?
When the complainant finished her testimony, the
defence made an application in terms of section 227.
The essence of the application was that the court
would give permission for the complainant to be
cross-examined regarding her sexual history.
Subsection 2 of the section reads as follows: 
Evidence as to sexual intercourse by, or any
sexual experience of any female against or in
connection with whom any offence of a
sexual nature is alleged to have been
committed, shall not be adduced, and such
female shall not be questioned regarding such
sexual intercourse or sexual experience,
except with the leave of the court, which
leave shall not be granted unless the court is
satisfied that such evidence or questioning is
relevant: Provided that such evidence may
be adduced and such female may be so
questioned in respect of the offence being
tried.
The court granted this application – but it would
appear that it did not properly deal with the
provision. The reading of the judgment shows that
attention was not paid to the proviso contained in
the section, which reads as follows:
Provided that such evidence may be
adduced and such female may be so
questioned in respect of the offence which is
being tried (emphasis added).
While the court relied on the general requirement of
relevancy, the proviso that places a limitation on
this requirement was not adequately dealt with. The
proviso is aimed at regulating the approach the
court should take in interpreting the main
requirement. In essence, the proviso ensures that
the court should not grant an application requiring
evidence of the complainant’s sexual history and
her cross-examination based on such history unless
the court is satisfied that such evidence is relevant. 
The proviso therefore requires that such evidence
and cross-examination, besides being relevant, be in
respect of the offence being tried, and no other. It is
not sufficient for the evidence to be relevant unless
it is in respect of the offence being tried.
What is left unexplained in the judgment is what
the proviso means or is supposed to mean. Such an
explanation is crucial to the proper interpretation of
the section. What will the regional courts, when
faced with similar applications, do but follow the
precedent set in this judgment, as though the
proviso did not exist? Which shrewd defence lawyer
appearing for an accused person on a rape charge
will not invoke section 227(2) on the same grounds
as S v Zuma, particularly in the regional courts that
are bound by the precedent? And what are the
likely implications of this situation? 
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The constitutional right to dignity, privacy and
equality
The second issue discussed in this article with
regard to S v Zuma is much more vexed and relates
to the constitutional approach to the interpretation
of the law. This problem arises when one accepts,
as one must do, that the application in terms of
section 227(2) places a limitation on the
complainant’s right to human dignity, privacy and
equality.
Just what is human dignity and how important is it?
Dignity has been described as a proper sense of
pride and self-respect, respectfulness or formality in
a person’s behaviour and bearing, the condition of
being worthy of respect, esteem or honour, the
respect or honour that a high rank or position is
shown.2 It is also described as the state of being
worthy of honour or respect.3
The fact that dignity appears in so many articles of
the Constitution and follows immediately after the
right to equality in the Bill of Rights is not
accidental or the result of verbosity. It illustrates
how serious and fundamental human dignity is to
the Constitution of this country. These constitutional
values oblige the courts to make a radical departure
from our past culture of dehumanising others, and
instead to engender a culture of equality and
respect for others.
The relevance of human dignity to this case was
presented to the court at the very early stages of the
trial. When setting out the basis of his defence,
Zuma indicated that the complainant had made
similar accusations against other men in the past.
Nobody could miss the possibility of the
encroachment onto the sexual history of the
complainant and the consequences that it would
bring to bear on her right to human dignity.  
The court seems to have appreciated the potential
infringement of the complainant’s right to human
dignity and her possible humiliation. This appears
from, among others, the fact that the court read the
following extract from S v M4 into its judgment: 
The difficulty is in determining when sexual
experiences are relevant, either to the issues
or to the general creditworthiness of the
victim. Controversy has arisen because
(male) common law judges have allegedly
been too willing to allow (female) victims’
previous sexual character to be revealed,
most often in cross-examination. In
consequence, victims wanting to prosecute
their assailants have had to be prepared to
subject themselves to the ordeal, at both
committal and trial of a long and searching
cross-examination on their sexual
experiences and attitudes. Needless to say,
the potential humiliation and embarrassment
of this ordeal, has discouraged victims from
prosecuting their assailants. This controversy
has led to legislative protection against
gratuitous revelation of a victim’s character.5
It has to be emphasised that the complainant’s right
to human dignity is not only inherent, but also non-
derogable. ‘Inherent’ is defined as “…existing in
something, especially as a permanent or
characteristic attribute; vested in (a person, etc.) as
a right or privilege.6 To say a right is ‘non-
derogable’ means that its protection cannot in
anyway be lessened or deviated from. No
legislation, including in this case section 227, can
entitle the court to derogate from this right. 
On the other hand, the accused’s rights under the
Constitution are not inherent, but are non-
derogable. The court had made a point that the
questioning and the leading of evidence of the
complainant’s sexual history was “fundamental to
the accused’s defence… relevant to the issue of
consent, the question of motive and indeed
credibility as well”. This may well have been, but
does it conclude the enquiry in view of the
contestation that existed between the opposing
rights of the complainant and the accused? 
The fact that the court was seized with two
conflicting rights, one inherent and the other not;
one argued for or understood because of repetition,
and the other not; did not receive the attention in
the judgment it surely deserved. 
It immediately becomes obvious that the
application made to lead evidence and cross-
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examine the complainant about her sexual history
would necessarily limit her fundamental rights, and
that the provisions of section 227(2) should have
been pitted against section 36 of the Constitution for
validity. 
One would also have noticed that there were
competing rights: those inherent rights of the
complainant, and those of the accused, not inherent,
but equally entrenched and non-derogable. No
solution was sought to this contestation, and it has
not been recorded as part of the judgment, despite
the constitutional mandate for courts to deal with it. 
A role for presiding officers 
It may well be that the infringement of the
complainant’s dignity, and other rights enshrined in
the Constitution were not raised during the hearing of
the section 227 application, as there is no reference
to this in the judgment. However, the Constitution is
the supreme law of the country and any law that is
inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid. 
This provision is binding on all organs of state and
the judiciary and assures everyone equality before the
law and equal protection by the law. It obliges the
courts to respect, protect and promote the rights and
values enshrined in the Bill of Rights and to interpret
the Bill of Rights in a manner that seeks to promote
the values that underlie an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom.
The significance of this constitutional imperative is
evident in that, upon taking office, judges are
required to take a prescribed oath. Those judges
appointed before the Constitution came into
operation also take the new oath. Their oath is not
different from that taken by judicial officers in the
lower courts and states as follows:
I, [name of judge], swear/solemnly affirm that,
as a judge of the High Court, will be faithful
to the Republic of South Africa, will uphold
and protect the Constitution and the human
rights entrenched in it, and will administer
justice to all persons alike without fear, favour
or prejudice, in accordance with the
Constitution and the law.
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The content of this oath implies that constitutional
issues that may arise during any trial by a court of
law must be dealt with. It also implies that all law,
common law or statutory, that needs to be
interpreted must be tested against the Constitution,
and particularly the Bill of Rights, for validity at all
times. If this is not done and only the letter of the
law is considered, grievous and irreversible harm
may be done.
It therefore follows that all judicial officers must at
all times have their ‘constitutional hats’ on. Judged
against this interpretation of the constitutional
imperative, therefore, the court in the Zuma case
should have considered the constitutional
justifiability of granting the section 227 application. 
The case of S v Fanuel Sitakeni Masiya7 illustrates
this point well. In this case a 44 year-old man was
charged with raping a nine year-old girl who was
well known to him as a companion of her parents,
with whom he normally drank. The evidence during
the hearing in the regional court showed that the
penetration by the male organ was through the girl’s
anus and not her vagina. The common law offence
of rape can only take place through the vaginal
orifice; penetration through any other orifice
amounts to indecent assault, which is treated as a
minor offence with a far lighter sentence than the
prescribed sentence for rape.
Both the prosecutor and the defence in this case
submitted that if the court accepted the evidence of
the complainant, the accused should rightfully be
convicted of indecent assault. Applying the law to
the letter, these two lawyers were right, as the
current definition of rape does not include non-
consensual penetration per anum. However, the
magistrate typified the common law definition of
rape as ‘unconstitutional’ and in a well-reasoned
judgment proceeded to convict the accused of rape.
He found the common law definition of rape to be
archaic and that it: 
…discriminates arbitrarily against all (males
and females, children and adults) with
reference to which kind of sexual
penetration is to be regarded as most
serious; such discrimination is illogical,
It is laudable that the judge had intended his
judgment to be educational, but in the absence of a
clear explanation of the interpretation of section
227 and its proviso, it can sadly not be said that
this educational goal was achieved.
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unjust, irrational and unconstitutional and
negates rights and values of human dignity,
equality and freedom [in section 7(2) of the
Constitution].8
The magistrate was of the view that he had an
obligation not only to apply the Constitution to
every matter he was faced with, but also to develop
the common law in terms of section 8(3) of the Bill
of Rights to “give effect to victims’ and society’s
rights and interests and to limit the rights of
accused”.9 The magistrate’s decision was endorsed
by RANCHOD, AJ, in the Transvaal Provincial
Division of the High Court and referred to the
Constitutional Court for confirmation.
Consider the verdict
Arguably, the verdict in the Zuma case was
influenced by the decision of the court to grant the
section 227 application. Some may even suggest
that the outcome could have been different had it
not been for the granting of this application. Either
way, the decision has set a precedent that is now
binding on the lower courts. 
It is also concerning that the court missed an
opportunity to align the provisions of section 227
with the constitutional dictates that govern the
administration of justice in the current dispensation.
It is untenable that the Constitution was not relied
on when interpreting this section, and this raises
serious constitutional questions, especially with
regard to the non-derogable right to human dignity. 
A decision such as this one, especially in the
absence of a proper exploration of section 227 and
its proviso, makes it difficult to counter the lay
argument that ‘accused persons seem to enjoy more
rights than victims’. Given that rape is one of the
most underreported crimes worldwide, it is difficult
to see how reporting rates can be improved if there
is a likelihood that the complainant’s sexual history
will be paraded in an open court. This is not to say
that such evidence should not be included where
justified. Rather, the point is to emphasise that when
an application in terms of section 227 is granted,
the reasons should be based on clear legal
determinations with due regard to the constitutional
imperatives binding on all judicial officers.
